Business mergers are prevalent today, yet their effects on various aspects of enterprise, particularly market competition, remain underexplored. The author distinguishes three main types of corporate mergers: horizontal, involving firms producing similar items; vertical, concerning supplier-customer relationships; and conglomerate, which encompasses any merger that is neither horizontal nor vertical. Economists have not reached a consensus on the definition or competitive effects of conglomerate mergers. This work clarifies the meaning of conglomerate mergers by analyzing legislative concerns stemming from the 1950 Amendment to Section 7 of the Clayton Act. It examines factors that influence how these mergers affect competition, revealing conditions under which they can either enhance or diminish market competition. The author meticulously compiles statistics on conglomerate merger activity, managerial behavior in diversified firms, and market structure, providing a comprehensive analysis of their competitive effects. While not all may agree with the findings, legislators, antitrust lawyers, economists, and business professionals will find the insights valuable. Given the current wave of mergers and ongoing public policy discussions, this analysis is timely and relevant. Several significant conglomerate merger cases are currently in litigation, making this work essential for future discourse. This title is part of UC Press's V
