This study systematically explores institutional solutions to the dictator's dilemma, which stems from the difficulty in balancing repression and concessions due to limited information about elite and popular discontent. It examines various information-gathering institutions in autocracies, highlighting the distinction between standard retrospective assessments of overt dissatisfaction and more advanced anticipatory evaluations of latent discontent. The author argues that while creating institutions for involuntary information collection is relatively simple, only certain regimes effectively encourage the voluntary provision of information, crucial for anticipatory governance. In ethnically diverse nations, compact ethnic minorities pose additional challenges to achieving a comprehensive authoritarian oversight. Despite these hurdles, communist regimes excel in developing intricate systems that leverage the party, State Security, and internal journalism to gauge discontent levels. Methodologically, the study shows that documents intended for regime insiders often reveal more about secretive information collection than publicly available materials. Theoretically, it posits that while resolving the dictator's dilemma and acquiring abundant information can prolong authoritarian rule, such information cannot guarantee the eternal survival of dictatorships. The analysis focuses on the evolution of information-gathering systems in c
