Axiomatic Formal Ontology offers a systematic exploration of general metaphysics using the axiomatic method. It focuses on constructing a non-set-theoretical theory of intensional entities, while also addressing the metaphysics of modality, actual existence, mereology, and entity taxonomy.
This book presents a comprehensive, non-model-theoretic theory of ontic necessity and possibility within a formal (and formalized) ontology consisting of states of affairs, properties, and individuals. Its central thesis is that all modalities are reducible to intrinsic (or „logical“) possibility and necessity if reference is made to certain states of affairs, called „bases of necessity.“ The viability of this Bases-Theory of Modality is shown also in the case of conditionals, including counterfactual conditionals. Besides the ontological aspects of the philosophy of modality, also the epistemology of modality is treated in the book. It is shown that the Bases-Theory of Modality provides a satisfactory solution to the epistemological problem of modality. In addition to developing that theory, the book includes detailed discussions of positions in the philosophy of modality maintained by Alvin Plantinga, David Lewis, Charles Chihara, Graeme Forbes, David Armstrong, and others. Among the themes treated are: possibilism vs. actualism; the theory of essences; conceivability and possibility; the nature of possible worlds; the nature of logical, nomological, and metaphysical possibility and necessity.
This book explores metaphysics through a model that allows for systematic and comprehensive analysis. By using sustained analogy, it provides valuable insights into metaphysical doctrines, methods, and epistemology, enriching the understanding of the subject.
Mit Beiträgen von: Martin Carrier, Anthony Dardes, Kevin Guilfoy, Carsten Held, Gyula Klima, Volker Peckhaus, Eric M. Rubenstein, Rudolf Schüßler, Heda Segvic, Niko Strohbach, David Sullivan, Ron Wilburn.
Mit Beiträgen von: José L. Bermúdez, Nino B. Cocchirella, Dirk Greimann, Leila Haaparanta, Ludger Jansen, Dale Jacquette, Reinhard Kahle, Franz von Kutschera, Wolfgang Neuser, Christof Rapp, Rosemarie Rheinwald, Lothar Ridder, Oliver R. Scholz.
Mit Beiträgen von: Rüdiger Bittner, David Gilboa, Wolfgang Lenzen, Claudia Lorena García, Wolfgang Malzkorn, Rainer Noske, Frederick Rauscher, Diederick Raven, Nicholas Rescher, Christian Schäfer, Jürgen Villers, Edward Zalta.
Mit Beiträgen von: Wolfgang Künne, Franz von Kutschera, Uwe Meixner, Albert Newen, Ulrich Nortmann, Graham Priest, Jay F. Rosenberg, Paul Thom, Hermann Weidemann, Jan Woleøski, Michael Wolff.
A Plea in the Case of Wittgenstein & Company versus Phenomenology
The phenomenological approach to the philosophy of mind, as inaugurated by Brentano and worked out in a very sophisticated way by Husserl, has been severely criticized by philosophers within the Wittgensteinian tradition and, implicitly, by Wittgenstein himself. Their criticism is, in the epistemological regard, directed against introspectionism, and in the ontological regard, against an internalist and qualia-friendly, non-functionalist (or: broadly dualistic/idealistic) conception of the mind. The book examines this criticism in detail, looking at the writings of Wittgenstein, Ryle, Hacker, Dennett, and other authors, reconstructing their arguments, and pointing out where they fall short of their aim. In defending Husserl against his Wittgensteinian critics, the book also offers a comprehensive fresh view of phenomenology as a philosophy of mind. In particular, Husserl’s non-representationalist theory of intentionality is carefully described in its various aspects and elucidated also with respect to its development, taking into account writings from various periods of Husserl’s career. Last but not least, the book shows Wittgensteinianism to be one of the effective roots of the present-day hegemony of physicalism.
This collection features eleven essays exploring key themes in the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, focusing on specific aspects rather than providing a comprehensive overview. It is particularly relevant for those engaged with contemporary philosophy of mind, which has expanded to include phenomenological and intentional dimensions alongside causal and functional perspectives. This resurgence has led many philosophers, especially from the analytic tradition, to rediscover Husserlian phenomenology. Central to the collection are five essays examining Husserl’s insights on perceptual experience and justification, preceded by discussions on apprehension and motivation—important concepts in Husserl’s work. Following these are essays addressing empathy and emotions, often overlooked topics in phenomenology. The opening essay presents complementarism as an alternative to Husserl’s classical phenomenological method, transcendental reduction. The concluding essay tackles the ontological issue of collective unity in Kant and Husserl, vital for understanding transcendental philosophy. All essays are original contributions that have undergone a peer-review process, authored by a diverse group of scholars.