The bounds of freedom: Kant’s causal theory of action

Viac o knihe

This monograph offers a fresh interpretation of Kant’s àtemporal conception of the causality of free will. It analyzes Kant’s primary understanding of action as a causal consequence of the will, drawing on H. P. Grice’s causal theory of perception and P. F. Strawson’s modifications. The work challenges the common view that Kant’s maxim of an action serves as a causal determination, positing instead that the maxim defines the action. The central thesis asserts that an action, for Kant, should be seen primarily as an effect of the will, leading to the conclusion that the maxim can only be understood as its logical determination. The text engages with contemporary philosophical perspectives on causality and examines Kant’s own complementary theory presented in the Second Analogy of Experience, which frames causality as a natural and temporal relation among physical and psychological objects. This creates a conflict with Kant's àtemporal view. Scholars like Allen W. Wood either reject this conception or, like Henry E. Allison, accept it in a diluted form, both adhering to the assumption that the maxim is a causal determination. This monograph, however, rejects that assumption and positions itself outside of these established camps.