Modal Justification via Theories

Viac o knihe

This monograph articulates and defends a theory-based epistemology of modality (TEM). According to TEM, one can justifiably believe a modal claim if (a) she justifiably believes a theory supporting that claim, (b) she bases her belief on that theory, and (c) she has no defeaters for her belief. The book is divided into two parts. The first motivates TEM, elaborates on it, and addresses various objections. The second part evaluates the worth of accepting TEM by establishing criteria for modal epistemologies, ultimately highlighting TEM’s significant virtues. However, the author acknowledges that TEM is cautious, suggesting it may imply we lack justification for some modal claims we assume we hold. This raises questions about its connection to Peter van Inwagen's modal skepticism, which the author examines extensively. Interestingly, TEM provides a more effective path to modal skepticism than van Inwagen's approach, which the author argues is an advantage rather than a drawback. Additionally, he contends that other popular modal epistemologies do not offer greater modal justification than TEM. The conclusion clarifies TEM's relationship with other modal epistemologies, asserting that it need not compete with them but can serve as a complementary framework.