Staatssicherheit und KSZE-Prozess

Viac o knihe

The book examines the influence and activities of the East German Ministry of State Security (MfS or Stasi) in relation to the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and its subsequent conferences. It highlights the MfS's dual role: supporting the hardline stance of East German leadership during the CSCE process while also adhering to Soviet demands for a strict separation from West Germany. Minister of State Security Erich Mielke advocated for a tough approach toward West Germany, aligning with both the East German Party leadership and Soviet directives. However, the economic challenges faced by the GDR and the Soviet Union, particularly during the 1980s arms race with NATO and the U.S., forced both regimes to make concessions to the West, which limited the MfS's ability to suppress dissent within East Germany. This situation was further complicated by a growing movement for emigration to West Germany, spurred by the GDR's signing of the CSCE Final Act in 1975. Ultimately, the Stasi, caught between the demands of the East German Party and the Soviet Union, struggled to manage the domestic repercussions of the CSCE process and détente due to the concessions made by its two "masters" to the West.