Is there a "science of history"? Must historians be scientists? What is "history" anyway? Celebrated researchers and historians--including Pulitzer-Prize winner John Lewis Gaddis and Nobel laureate Murray Gell-Mann--debate these complex questions in this thoughtful collection of essays.
“The best education in grand strategy available in a single volume . . . a book that should be read by every American leader or would-be leader.”—The Wall Street Journal A master class in strategic thinking, distilled from the legendary program the author has co-taught at Yale for decades John Lewis Gaddis, the distinguished historian of the Cold War, has for almost two decades co-taught grand strategy at Yale University with his colleagues Charles Hill and Paul Kennedy. Now, in On Grand Strategy, Gaddis reflects on what he has learned. In chapters extending from the ancient world through World War II, Gaddis assesses grand strategic theory and practice in Herodotus, Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Octavian/Augustus, St. Augustine, Machiavelli, Elizabeth I, Philip II, the American Founding Fathers, Clausewitz, Tolstoy, Lincoln, Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Isaiah Berlin. On Grand Strategy applies the sharp insights and wit readers have come to expect from Gaddis to times, places, and people he’s never written about before. For anyone interested in the art of leadership, On Grand Strategy is, in every way, a master class.
Focusing on George F. Kennan, a pivotal yet complex figure in Cold War history, this biography explores his role in formulating the U.S. strategy to contain the Soviet Union through the influential "long telegram" and "X" article. The author, a leading historian, offers an in-depth look at Kennan's life, utilizing exclusive access to his archives. The narrative reveals the contradictions in Kennan's thoughts and actions, providing insight into a man whose life and ideas significantly impacted the course of the twentieth century.
Strategie powstrzymywania to jedna z najważniejszych publikacji Johna Lewisa Gaddisa. Wnikliwa analiza amerykańskiej polityki bezpieczeństwa narodowego oparta na niezwykle bogatym materiale źródłowym nie jest tylko cenną pracą naukową, ale również doskonałym podręcznikiem dla tych wszystkich, którzy profesjonalnie zajmują się tematyką dotyczącą Stanów Zjednoczonych.
Jak se z válečných spojenců tak rychle po roce 1945 stali nepřátelé na život a na smrt, kteří rozdělili svět na dva nesmiřitelné a po zuby ozbrojené tábory? A jak to všechno najednou skončilo? Teprve dnes, když je studená válka už patnáct let minulostí, můžeme začít hledat přesvědčivý a nezaujatý pohled na ni. V napínavé knize John Lewis Gaddis vysvětluje nejen co se stalo, ale i jak se to stalo: Proč Sovětský svaz brutálně potlačil povstání ve Východním Německu, Maďarsku a Československu, jak se Kennedy a Chruščov postavili navzájem proti sobě ve věci kubánské krize, proč Nixon a Mao Ce-tung usilovali o obezřetné sblížení, a co si nakonec mysleli o své vlastní činnosti Jan Pavel II., Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcherová a Michail Gorbačov. Faktografická hodnota díla je stejně vysoká jako vypravěčské umění, odhaluje, jak vysocí političtí představitelé od vrcholu a obyčejní lidé zdola společně zvrátili směr dějin a vybojovali jedno z největších vítězství lidského ducha v dějinách.
What is history and why should we study it? Is there such a thing as historical truth? Is history a science? One of the most accomplished historians at work today, John Lewis Gaddis, answers these and other questions in this short, witty, and humane book.
September 11, 2001, distinguished Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis argues, was not the first time a surprise attack shattered American assumptions about national security and reshaped American grand strategy. The pattern began in 1814, when the British Army attacked Washington, burning the White House and the Capitol. This early violation of American homeland security gave rise to a strategy of unilateralism and preemption, best articulated by John Quincy Adams, aimed at maintaining strength beyond challenge throughout the North American continent. It remained in place for over a century. Only when Japan attacked Pearl Harbour in 1941 did the inadequacies of this strategy become evident: as a consequence, the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt devised a new grand strategy of cooperation with allies on an intercontinental scale to defect authoritarianism. That strategy defined the American approach throughout World War II and the Cold War. The terrorist attacks of 9/11, Gaddis writes, made it clear that this strategy was now insufficient to ensure American security. The Bush administration has, therefore, devised a new grand strategy whose foundations lie in the nineteenth-
