Ronald Dworkin bol americký filozof práva, ktorého vplyvné diela formovali súčasnú debatu o práve a politickej filozofii. Jeho teória práva ako integrity predstavuje jednu z najvýznamnejších koncepcií povahy práva. Dworkin sa zaoberal hlbokými otázkami spravodlivosti a interpretácie, čím zanechal nezmazateľnú stopu v právnom myslení. Jeho prístup zdôrazňoval etické základy právnych systémov a ich prepojenie s politickými ideálmi.
Ríša práva, ktorá je jednou z najdôležitejších prác v rámci filozofie práva, sa po prvý raz dostáva k čitateľom v slovenskom preklade Dezidera Kamhala. Popredný americký filozof Ronald Dworkin v nej predstavuje svoju teóriu morálneho odôvodnenia práva, ktorá spája či prepája osobnú morálku, právne zdôvodnenie a politickú legitimitu. Ponúka tak odpoveď na otázku ako chápať právo a zároveň ponúka politickú teóriu, ktorá zdôvodňuje takéto chápanie práva. Slovenské vydanie knihy dopĺňa aktuálny doslov Alexandra Bröstla.
Dnes klasické dílo právní a politické filosofie je ucelenou studií o lidských právech a liberálním pojetí právního státu. Dworkin předestírá své teze o přirozenoprávním konceptu a staví se do opozice vůči konceptu pozitivněprávnímu (především proti svému předchůdci na stolici právní vědy v Oxfordu H. L. A. Hartovi).
In his final work, Dworkin explores profound questions about religion, the role of God, and the concepts of death and immortality, delving into the essence of these timeless themes.
How should a judge's moral convictions bear on his judgments about what the
law is? This book presents a collection of essays that focus on the roles of
justice in law.
The fox knows many things, the Greeks said, but the hedgehog knows one big thing. In his most comprehensive work, Ronald Dworkin argues that value in all its forms is one big thing: that what truth is, life means, morality requires, and justice demands are different aspects of the same large question. He develops original theories on a great variety of issues very rarely considered in the same book: moral skepticism, literary, artistic, and historical interpretation, free will, ancient moral theory, being good and living well, liberty, equality, and law among many other topics. What we think about any one of these must stand up, eventually, to any argument we find compelling about the rest. Skepticism in all its forms—philosophical, cynical, or post-modern—threatens that unity. The Galilean revolution once made the theological world of value safe for science. But the new republic gradually became a new empire: the modern philosophers inflated the methods of physics into a totalitarian theory of everything. They invaded and occupied all the honorifics—reality, truth, fact, ground, meaning, knowledge, and being—and dictated the terms on which other bodies of thought might aspire to them, and skepticism has been the inevitable result. We need a new revolution. We must make the world of science safe for value.
This is a book about the interplay of urgent political issues and hotly debated questions of moral philosophy. The controversies it joins are old; but history has given them fresh shape. Dworkin addresses questions about the Anglo-American legal system as protector of individual rights and as machinery for furthering the common good.
A forceful and landmark defence of individual rights, Taking Rights Seriously is one of the most important political philosophical works of the last 50 years.
Dworkin argues that equality, freedom, and individual responsibility are not
in conflict, but flow from and into one another as facets of the same humanist
conception of life and politics. He applies his principles to contemporary
controversies such as the distribution of health care, affirmative action,
assisted suicide, and genetic engineering.
