Six researchers from diverse backgrounds investigate the dynamics of authoritarian system development and reproduction. The chapters empirically illustrate how such systems gradually infiltrate and permeate societal and economic subsystems, capturing national, intermediate, and micro-level structures while reproducing themselves. They analyze mechanisms, instruments, and institutions of political capture, distinguishing between welfare, development, and recombinant projects and their interrelationships. An examination of political favoritism reveals the corruption risks associated with 242,183 public tenders, detailing the crony system's functioning and the network of political connections that facilitate the rapid enrichment of politically connected enterprises. The book highlights the vulnerability of democratic institutions to authoritarian and populist regimes, emphasizing the systemic nature of institutionalized corruption and its destructive impact on public and business sectors, as well as the built and natural environment. It showcases how a political party, exemplified by Viktor Orbán's Fidesz in Hungary, transformed into a centralized authoritarian system within a decade. Winning a constitutional majority in 2010 allowed them to stabilize and reproduce their power, achieving further majorities in 2014 and 2018. The authors reveal how democratic settings can be manipulated for political capture, detailing the penetrat
Imre Kovách Poradie kníh (chronologicky)
